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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

;
:

Case No. 990470-CA

:
Priority No. 2

DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of defendant's motion to quash
and dismissal of a third degree felony charge of damaging a jail, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) and § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether defendant's conduct alleged in this case, scratching an obscenity into
the paint of a door in a jail cell, constitutes damage to a jail as prohibited by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-418. This question of the interpretation of the terms of a statute is an issue
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Harley, slip op at 3 (June 17, 1999); State v.

Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1996):
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down,
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 19, 1998, defendant was charged with one count of damaging a
jail, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (R.4). At the preliminary hearing,
defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 17)
(hereinafter, "Prelim"), which the magistrate denied, and defendant was bound over
(R.72). Defendant then filed a motion in District Court to quash the bindover and
dismiss the charge (R.85). On April 13, 1999, the district judge granted defendant's
motion (R.103), and the State now appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 25, 1998, defendant was arrested and brought into the Utah County
Jail (Prelim, p. 6). Defendant was put in a holding cell because of his failure to
cooperate with the booking process (Prelim, p. 6). Defendant continued to be verbally
abusive after being placed in the cell, yelling and banging on the door of the cell with
his hands (Prelim, p. 7). After defendant calmed down, he was removed from the cell.
Defendant came out holding up two keys and a penny (Prelim, p. 13), and kept saying
"I'm sorry, I'm sorry" (Prelim, p. 7). After defendant was removed from the cell, the
2

booking officer found that the word "fuck" had been scratched into the back door of
the cell in letters approximately 4-6 inches in height (Prelim, p. 8).
In order to repair the damage done to the cell, two painters came in and painted
over the door with a special epoxy base paint, waited a number of hours, and then
applied another coat of the paint (Prelim, p. 12).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The 'damaging jails' statute punishes anyone who "breaks down, pulls down,
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail. . . ." The language of this
statute by its terms broadly applies to any damage done to a jail facility, and the statute
nowhere implies that a high degree of damage is a minimum threshold before the
statute applies. The two Utah cases considering the scope of the statute found that the
plain language of the statute must be given effect to broadly cover "any" damage done
to a jail. Since the plain language of the statute is not ambiguous, in that it does not
render the statute either inoperable or confusing, no further interpretive doctrines need
be applied to ascertain the proper scope of the statute. Further, the legislative history
of this statute shows that it was intended to cover any damage done to a jail facility,
without regard to the cost of repairs or to the level of inconvenience or danger caused
by the need to make repairs within a jail setting.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND
INCLUDES ANY DAMAGE TO A JAIL; NO FURTHER
INTERPRETIVE RULE NEED BE APPLIED TO CONSTRUE THE
LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE, AND THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY CONFIRMS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A BROAD
READING OF ITS TERMS.
A. The statute is unambiguous and its plain meaning provides for broad
application to "any damage" done to a jail facility.
The damaging jails statute at issue in this case provides as follows:
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down,
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1996) (emphasis added). The trial court held that the
phrase "otherwise damages" must be limited to include only damage which is "of a
similar nature and comparable gravity" to the other harms listed in the statute, and
found that the damage alleged in this case were not within the scope of the statute
(R. 101). However, the language of this statute has been twice considered by this
Court, and in both cases, its broad application to any act of damaging a jail facility has
been acknowledged.
In State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991), the court considered a
defendant's argument that a lesser included instruction on the crime of criminal
mischief should have been given. The court assumed (and the state conceded) that the
4

crime of criminal mischief was, in fact, a lesser included offense to the crime of
damaging jails because the criminal mischief statute and the damaging jails statutes both
encompass "any" injury to property to the property of another. The request for a lesser
included instruction on criminal mischief was rejected, however, because there was no
rational basis for acquitting defendant of the damaging a jail charge and still convicting
defendant of criminal mischief. "[A]ny damage to the facility amounted to an injury.
And, as we have already discussed, the area damaged was the jail. Therefore, there is
no interpretation of the evidence that would rationally allow for acquittal of injury to a
jail and, at the same time, allow for a conviction of criminal mischief." Jaimez, 817
P.2d at 827. Thus, the scope of these two statutes, in terms of the degree of damage,
are the same. Any damage to property is punishable under either statute, and the only
difference between the scope of the statutes is the type of property which is damaged.
State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993) affirms this broad
interpretation of the scope of the statute. In Pharris, defendant made the same claim
that defendant makes in this case, that the damaging jails statute only refers to
"substantial damage," and that its application to the relatively minor damage caused in
that case (breaking of a bunk weld and damage to an automatic clock on a back-up
generator in the basement) constituted a denial of due process, since defendant had no
notice that such minor damage would violate the damaging jails statute. In rejecting
this argument, the court observed that "as recognized in Jaimez, the statutory language
5

includes 'any damage to the facility' within the plain meaning of 'injury.'" Pharris,
846 P.2d at 466. The court thus rejected defendant's claim that the damaging jails
statute only refers to substantial damage because the broad language of the statute must
be accepted as written. "This broad interpretation of the word 'injury' negates
defendant's claim that the statute failed to give him fair warning that his actions could
result in a felony conviction." Id.
Of course, one may quibble about the relative seriousness of the damage or the
relative costs of the repairs caused under the specific facts of Jaimez, Pharris, or this
case. However, such an inquiry into whether it is more costly or dangerous to repair a
bunk bracket, as in Pharris, or repaint a cell door, as in this case, is irrelevant. The
court's rulings in Jaimez and Pharris were not based upon some calculation as to the
relative seriousness of the particular damage done in those cases. Instead, these
decisions are based on the court's basic finding that, by its plain language, the
damaging jails statute applies to all damage, of whatever degree.
This valuation concept is immaterial in the context of protecting the
functioning of a jail. While costly damage could have minimal impact
on the safe functioning of the facility, minimal damage to critical parts of
the physical facilities could have disastrous consequences. For this
reason, we conclude that protecting each essential part of the facility
without regard to the cost of repairing it is rationally related to the goal of
inmate and public safety.
Pharris, 846 P.2d at 468 (emphasis added). There is no evidence in record as to how
much it cost to repair the cell door damaged by defendant in this case, or regarding the
6

degree of disruption to the operation of the jail and danger to others caused by the fact
that this cell was unusable for some period of time during the repairs. Such evidence is
irrelevant because the statute does not require the state to prove that some minimum of
cost, danger, or disruption to jail operations has occurred in order for the statute to
have been violated.
Two other states with damaging jails statutes have also broadly interpreted the
scope of the same language used in the Utah statute. In State v. Ash, 493 P.2d 701
(Idaho 1971), the court considered the scope of the Idaho statute prohibiting damage to
a jail as a felony, which is essentially identical to the Utah statute, and held that it
applied to a broken window. Id., 493 P.2d at 705. In State v. Mathews, 633 P.2d
1039 (Arizona 1981), the court ruled that the Arizona statute, which is also identical to
the Utah statute, applied to defendant's jamming of a lock by "bottling the mechanism
with toilet paper." Id., 633 P.2d at 1041.
B. The doctrines of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis need not be used to
- interpret the unambiguous language in this statute.
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the doctrines of noscitur a sociis
("it is known from its associates") and ejusdem generis ("of the same kind") should be
applied to this statute in order to determine its intended meaning. These related
principles provide that "when general terms follow specific ones, the general terms
must be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific
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terms." State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah App. 1991). In its Ruling dismissing
the charge in this case, the trial court found that "the 'otherwise damages' language in
the statute must be restricted to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity to
the behavior defined in the statute." R.lOl. The court's application of this interpretive
doctrine is not appropriate in light of the unambiguous language of the statute.1
A court may resort to such canons of statutory interpretation as noscitur a sociis
or ejusdem generis only if it first makes a finding that the plain language of the statute
is ambiguous in some way:
When we construe a statute, we first explore its plain language and use
other modes of interpretation only if the language contains ambiguities.
Unless a literal reading would render the statute's wording unreasonably
inoperable or confusing, we accord the wording its " 'usual and accepted

1

The trial court's ruling also states that "[c]ourts must apply a case-by-case
approach to determine whether any injury to a jail constitutes 'damage' under the
statute," citing Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466. However, Pharris does not require such
case-by-case determination of the relative seriousness of the damage caused. Indeed,
there was no evidence in Pharris as to the cost of the repairs or the level of disruption
caused, and, as noted above, Pharris expressly disclaimed the need for any such caseby-case assessment. Id. at 468. In concluding that Pharris dictates a case-by-case
evaluation of the nature of the damages caused, the trial court apparently relied on the
Pharris court's refusal to consider the defendant's argument that the statute was voidfor-vagueness on its face because of the court's finding that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the undisputably physical damage alleged in that
case. Id. at 466. Thus, although some theoretical application of the statute to harm to
or disruption of the facility that is non-physical in nature may be unconstitutional
(because there are no meaningful standards to apply in such a case), where an actual
physical injury of some sort is alleged, there is no vagueness problem. "The statute
sets the standard that any injury to a physical facility used for jail functions can be
punished under the statute." Id.
8

meaning*" and do not "'look beyond plain and unambiguous language to
•/ ascertain legislative intent.'* We merely assume the Legislature carefully
and advisedly chose the statute's words and phrases,
j
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Its face. In 1996, the phrase 44or otherwise destroys or injures any public jail

2

This code section provides as follows:

The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to
this code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this
state. All provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this
state shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to
promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes
of Section 76-1-104

9

" was

substituted with the even less ambiguous phrase "or otherwise damages any public jail.
. ." The plain meaning of these phrases is the same, and is on its face not limited to
any particular type or degree of damage. See Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466 ("As
recognized in Jaimez, the statutory language includes 'any damage to the facility'
within the plain meaning of 'injury'"). There is simply no ambiguity in this statute
which would require the court to consider anything other than its plain language. See
Vogt, 824 P.2d at 458 (finding that noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis should be
applied to construe the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "any other act of gross
lewdness").3
C. Legislative history supports a broad reading of the statute.
The 'damaging jails' statute was originally derived from a California Penal Code
section, and remained essentially unchanged from its adoption in 1898 until it was
amended in 1996. See Utah Revised Statutes, Penal Code § 4433 (1898) (Addendum

3

Even if the court were apply noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis and consider
the other terms of the statute in order to construe the meaning of "otherwise damages,"
these doctrines would not dictate a more limited reading of the statute. If the scope of
the statute was construed to be limited to the types of harm implied by the words
"breaks down, pulls down, destroys, [or] floods," there are two options. First, these
terms could be read with a limited scope, meaning an almost complete destruction of
the jail structure. However, as Jaimez and Pharris show, that is not the intent of the
statute. Second, these vague terms could be construed more broadly; e.g., "breaks
down" could mean to break down some piece or part of the jail. If this is true, there is
no logical reason to limit the application of the terms to breaking down some
unspecified "significant" part of the jail.
10

1). The fact that the original statutory language from the Galifonua Penal Code was
intended to cover all damage to a jail, no matter how minor, is made clear by later
amend*

i

;IIII IPU eption

1111 li lii.idf" <I;im;ipes worth less than $2004 a misdemeanor. Cal. Penal

Code § 4600 (West 1996) (Addendum 1). The implication is i^t, without ihe later
exception, the original language, as adopted in r ^ 1

" ' :^ed ?]] damage to a jai1

'Ihe later amendmen* *° ne Utah statute also confir ;.>> uuiau.j
•

*

( > K 4 ! K \ A

for
Every A person v» L- willfully and intentionally breaks d^*n, pulls d. \K\\9
destroys, floods, or otherwise destroys or injures damages any public jail
or othei i;;-iace of confinement is guilty < A a felony of the third degree.
See Utah Codv Ann. AiuCi^hiciit Notes.

Tn

^roposi.ig iin^ amendment iw

A. .eeie

Thank you Mr. Speaker. House Bill 44 came to me from some of .>...,;
county attorneys who've been having problems with inmates, who are
state inmates they were holding in the county facilities, who w ere taking
their towels and shirts and sheets and other things and putting them
in the toilets until they flooded the jail. Current statute says a person
who willfully or intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, injures
any other public jail or place of confinement is guilty of a felony of third
degree. But flooding is not in there, this simply adds the word - adds
flooding to that in both adult and juvenile facilities. Thank you I
appreciate your support.

' I his J i i i i< n u it: i. is

'o $400 in 1983.
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February 13, 1996 House AM Tape 1 at 804 (emphasis added) {see Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R.50). Accordingly, the word
"floods" was added in order to address the problem of inmates making their toilets
overflow, causing minor flooding which presumably did not cause any physical damage
to the jail other than the necessity for cleanup. If physical damage to a jail caused by
more extensive flooding were being addressed, there would be no need for an
amendment, as Jaimez and Pharris, which both addressed flooding which caused some
actual physical damage, make clear. By adding a provision which covers the relatively
minor problem of overflowing toilets, and which does not even require the existence of
physical harm to the jail, the legislature made clear its intent that any damage to a jail is
meant to be covered by the statute. See Ash, 493 P.2d at 705 ("The legislature has
concluded that damaging a jail is a more serious criminal act than damaging other real
or personal property").

12

CONCLUSI C »I i
. •por

bindover and dismissal of

'the charge should be reversed and the case remanded for fiirther proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 1 day of September, 1999.

JAIN U K A l i A M

Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed by first
class mail this 2 L ^ a y °f September, 1999 to:
Margaret P. Lindsay
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603

14

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

TH K

REVISED STATUTES
OF ' THE

STATE OF UTAH,
IN FORCE

JA

- 1898

Bivi'ihd, Amiulul
in i "'I"

RICHARD W. YOUNG,
GRANT H. SMITH,
WILLIAM A. LEE,
Code Commissioners.

TOGETHER "W IT'II THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U N I T E D STATES, THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, THE ENABLING ACT, ANH
THE NATURALIZATION LAWS

934

P E N A L CODE.

3*. Maliciously cuts down or removes any tree upon which any such
have been made for such purpose, with intent to destroy such marks * ^ ^
of a misdemeanor. fC. L. § 4712*
Cal. Pen. C. § 605*.

U. S. monuments, etc, £ 4438

3%

4433. Injuring or d e s t r o y i n g j a i l . Every person who wilful!
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or otherwise destroys or injure*
public jail or other place of confinement, is guilty of a felony. [C. L. § 4— ^
Cal. Pen. C. i 606*.
+3&C

4434. Injuring or destroying canal, reservoir, etc. Every -*"'*

%

who wilfully and maliciously cuts, breaks, injures, or destroys any bridge* * ^
canal, flume, aqueduct, levee, embankment, leservoir, or other structure erf, < t
to create hydraulic power, or to drain or reclaim any swamp and overflowed 3
marsh land, or to conduct water for mining, manufacturing, reclamation, or 4 •*'
cultural purposes, or for the supply of the inhabitants of any city or tows***
any embankment necessary to the same, or either of them; or w ilf ully or m
ciously makes or causes to be made, any apertuie in such dam, canal, flui.
aqueduct, reservoir, embankment, levee, or structure, with intent to i n i u r ^
destroy the same; or draws up, cuts, or injures any piles fixed in the g r o u n d s
used for securing any lake or river bank or walls, or any dock, quay, jetty lock, is punishable by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisons;^
in the state prison not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment
[C. L. § 4714*.
* y£
Cal. Pen C \ 007*.
Interfering \wth water f uictt, etc t % 4448, 4449

Interference with 01 I irtetn of \sater, 33 4372.

4435. B u r n i n g or d e s t r o y i n g l u m b e r , e t c . B o a t s . Every perl:
who wilfully and maliciously burns, injures, or destroys any pile or raft of wc
plank, boards, or other lumber, or any part theieof, or cuts loose or setsadu
any such raft or any part thereof, or cuts, breaks, injures, sinks, or sets adrift °*
vessel, boat, or skiff, the property of another, is punishable by a fine in any sn:
less than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not excecc
ing six months. [C. L. § 4715.
Cal Pen. C. ? 608*

Burning property not the subject of arson, { 4 t

4436. I n j u r i n g o r d e f a c i n g U . S. m o n u m e n t s , e t c . Every per<~
who wilfully injures, defaces, or removes any signal, monument, building,
appurtenance thereto, placed, erected, or used by persons engaged in the Unite
States or state survey, is guilty of a misdemeanor. [C. L. § 4716*.
/
Cal Pen C ? 615"5.

RcmoMiig or defacing other monuments, J 44S

4437. Injuring o r d e s t r o y i n g t o l l - h o u s e o r g a t e . Every person wl
maliciously injures or destroys any toil-house or turnpike gate, is guilty of
misdemeanor. [C. L. § 4702.
"
J^g
Cal. Pen. C. \ 589.

4 4 3 8 . R e m o v i n g or injuring m i l e post, etc. Every person wt
maliciously removes or injures any mile board, post, or stone, or guide post, 1
any inscription on such, erected upon any highway, is guilty of a misdemeano
[C. L. § 4703.
Cal. Pen. C i 590.

4439. Defacing or destroying official notice or proclamatio:
Every person who intentionally defaces, obliterates, tears down, or destroys ai
copy or transcript, or extract from, or of, any law of the United Statea, or of tc
state, or any proclamation, advertisement, or notification set up at any place
this state, by authority of an)'' law of the United States or of this state, or 1
order of any court or of any public officer, before the expiration of the time 1
which the same was to remain set up, is punishable by fine not less than twen

ADDENDUM B

CA PENAL s 4600
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 4600
WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES
PENAL CODE
PART 3. OF IMPRISONMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY
TITLE 5. OFFENSES RELATING TO PRISONS AND PRISONERS
CHAPTER 4. DEMOLISHING PRISONS AND JAILS
Copr. © West Group 1999. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.
§ 4600. Punishment; restitution
(a) Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or otherwise destroys or injures any jail,
prison, or any public property in any jail or prison, is punishable by afinenot exceeding ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000),
and by imprisonment in the state prison, except that where the damage or injury to any city, city and county, or county
jail property or prison property is determined to be four hundred dollars ($400) or less, that person is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
(b) In any case in which a person is convicted of violating this section, the court may order the defendant to make
restitution to the public entity that owns the property damaged by the defendant. The court shall specify in the order
that the public entity that owns the property damaged by the defendant shall not enforce the order until the defendant
satisfies all outstandingfines,penalties, assessments, restitution fines, and restitution orders.
CREDIT(S)
1982 Main Volume
(Added by Stats. 194l,c. 106, p. 1126, § 15. Amended by Stats. 1957, c. 1733, p. 3117, § 2; Stats.1976, c. 1139, p.
5157, § 293.5, operative July 1, 1977; Stats.1978, c. 1186, p. 3837, § 2; Stats.1979, c. 255, p. 562, § 31.)
1999 Electronic Update
(Amended by Stats.1983, c. 1092, § 325, eff. Sept. 27, 1983, operative Jan. 1, 1984; Stats.1996, c. 803 (A.B.573), §
1.)
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
1999 Electronic Update
1983 Amendment. Substituted "four hundred dollars ($400)" for "two hundred dollars ($200)".
1996 Legislation
The 1996 amendment designated the existing section as subd. (a) and added subd. (b) relating to restitution.
1982 Main Volume
The 1957 amendment added the exception at the end of the section.
The 1976 amendment deleted "not exceeding five years" following "in the state prison."
The 1978 amendment inserted "any public property in any jail or prison" and deleted "a" before "fine".
The 1979 amendment included as a misdemeanor damage to "prison property" of $200 or less.
Derivation: Pen.C. § 606, amended by Stats. 1941, c. 106, p. 1082, § 9.
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